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Interoception is the ability to perceive and integrate physiological signals from within 1 
the body. It is closely related to the autonomic system and is a key component in the 2 
generation of affective states and abstract representations of the self (Critchley et al., 3 
2004; Ainley and Tsakiris, 2013). Seth proposes a predictive coding model of 4 
interoception that involves a free-energy based explanation of emotion awareness and 5 
selfhood. In this model, emotions, and in turn the sense of self, rely on predictions of 6 
the causes of interoceptive signals. Within this framework, the interoceptive system 7 
minimizes free-energy, or the discrepancy between predictions and interoceptive 8 
signals. Free-energy can be minimized either by updating predictions about the causes 9 
of the sensory signals (perceptual updating), or by acting to change autonomic states 10 
such that bodily states are more predictable (active inference).       11 
 12 
The free-energy principle is currently in vogue in neuroscience. We are no longer 13 
strangers to the idea that perception is an active iterative process between abstract 14 
representations (predictions) and sensory feedback (prediction errors) (Clark, 2013). 15 
The basic idea of PC in the cognitive sciences began with the notion of neural energy 16 
(Helmholtz, 1860) and it has been present since in the form of theoretical proposals 17 
and empirical findings, especially in the visual domain (Lee and Mumford, 2003). 18 
Therefore Seth’s proposal that sensory processing involves predictions is nothing 19 
new. What is new in Seth’s model is that perception of internal body signals 20 
(interoception), paralleling the perception of external signals, relies on top-down 21 
predictions of the causes of the sensory input, rather than being a passive, bottom-up 22 
process.  23 
 24 
Is then Seth’s interoceptive inference model an interesting proposal to explain 25 
emotion awareness and selfhood? My opinion is yes and that it is worth investigating. 26 
However, there are some aspects to consider before designing studies to empirically 27 
test Seth’s model.  28 
 29 
Seth’s model builds on three main assumptions. First, emotions are defined as 30 
affective states relying on interactions between top-down interoceptive predictions 31 
and bottom-up interoceptive prediction errors. Following the principles of PC, there is 32 
a constant attempt to minimize the discrepancy between the predicted and the actual 33 
sensory events, either through updating perceptual expectations or through active 34 
inference (Friston et al., 2010). As Seth nicely explains, active inference in 35 
interoception occurs when predictions are transcribed into reference points that trigger 36 
autonomic homeostatic regulation, occurring when the weight of the error is low and 37 
attention to errors is attenuated (Gu et al., 2013).  38 
 39 
Fortunately, advances on biomedical tools allow us to experimentally monitor the 40 
body’s physiological signals. Although, some methodological challenges still remain 41 
when investigating interoception. This general issue may also impact on PC studies of 42 
interoception. However, applying PC to interoception, as proposed in Seth’s model, 43 
may allow us to overcome these challenges. The main argument of PC is that all 44 
sensory systems are linked by working under identical code schemes (Friston and 45 
Kiebel, 2009). Therefore, Seth’s PC model allows us to apply knowledge from visual 46 
and other domains to investigate brain and behavioral mechanisms of interoception. 47 
Neuroimaging studies have demonstrated direct evidence of PC in visual brain areas 48 
(Egner et al., 2010, Wyart et al., 2012). Likewise, Seth’s anatomical predictions (i.e. 49 
anterior insular cortex -AIC) can be tested by using multivoxel pattern analysis 50 
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approaches, in combination with orthogonal experimental designs where the stimulus 51 
presentation probability is held constant in all conditions (Egner et al., 2010). 52 
    53 
The second assumption in Seth’s model refers to the AIC as the key structure that 54 
generates, compares and updates interoceptive predictions. Empirical evidence has 55 
shown that AIC houses a secondary associative area where interoceptive, 56 
exteroceptive and motivational signals converge (Seth and Critchley, 2013). An 57 
important principle of PC explains that the surprisal generated in one unimodal 58 
system can be explained away by inferences in other system via high-order neural 59 
areas (Apps and Tsakiris, 2013). Considering the multimodal nature of the AIC, one 60 
could suggest that the errors in the interoceptive signal can be explained by 61 
exteroceptive inferences (or vice versa) and that the interoceptive generative models 62 
are only a part of the way the system explains errors. Whether the AIC exclusively 63 
codes the surprisal evoked by interoceptive signals or, alternatively, if the AIC is 64 
involved in top-down general predictions directed to a more specialized interoceptive 65 
circuit, still remain open questions.  66 
 67 
The third crucial aspect of Seth’s model is the concept of selfhood. Seth has employed 68 
the idea that selfhood is formed by the integration of predictive interoceptive and 69 
exteroceptive signals (Tajadura-Jimenez and Tsakiris, 2013). Individual differences in 70 
the accuracy of interoceptive awareness influence integration of interoceptive and 71 
exteroceptive information, as shown by studies in body illusions (Tsakiris et al., 72 
2011). Individuals with low accuracy show more susceptibility to body illusions, 73 
which Seth interprets as lower precision-weighting of interoceptive prediction errors. 74 
However, although a free-energy model of self has been proposed (Apps and Tsakiris, 75 
2013), as yet there is no evidence to suggest that self-processing follows the principles 76 
of PC.  77 
 78 
Another crucial factor that may influence interoceptive awareness, and therefore self-79 
awareness, is attention. In PC, attention is considered to be a mechanism that 80 
optimizes the precision of prediction errors during hierarchical inference (Feldman 81 
and Friston, 2010). For example, studies in vision have demonstrated that attention 82 
enhances the neural specificity for expected vs unexpected stimuli in visual cortex 83 
(Jiang et al., 2013). Similarly, directing attention towards internal body signals might 84 
increase the precision of interoceptive prediction errors and therefore improve 85 
interoceptive awareness. An individual’s attention to the body can be significantly 86 
enhanced by the practice of Mindfulness (Farb et al., 2012), which also has the effect 87 
of enhancing both cortical responses of interoceptive attention and self-reported 88 
interoceptive awareness (Mehling et al., 2013). Within Seth’s model this might 89 
increase the accuracy of interoceptive inference, emotions, and self-awareness.  90 
 91 
Therefore, I agree with Seth’s proposal that the brain is a prediction machine that 92 
integrates interoceptive and exteroceptive information in a Bayesian way. However, 93 
future research is needed to elucidate the internal properties of the interoceptive 94 
inference. 95 
